Many descriptions of human nature imagine that human variation is variation around a central tendency or "normal" human form. This makes a lot of sense. Many human traits do seem nearly universal in humans (e.g. a bilateral bodily organization). Similarly, many descriptions of human moral psychology hypothesize that humans have a central or normal core of morality. For example, some moral philosophers view nearly every human as recognizing certain "moral fixed points" that can constrain moral theorizing. And many moral psychologists aim to characterize the moral capacities typical of humans. These philosophical and psychological views tend to view moral variation as noise around a central human form. Other ethical idealizations also tend to involve appeal to a unitary norm (e.g. the idea of the morally virtuous person).
In this talk, I explore the alternative possibility of moral variation as a manifestation of different moral "personalities" that are produced and sustained in ongoing contact with one another in a kind of moral ecology or a division of moral labor. Drawing upon the biological idea of polymorphisms in a population, I offer some empirical evidence that this could be true. I then argue that if it is true, it follows that our moral dispositions are co-produced and sustained alongside the dispositions and judgments of those we find ourselves in persistent disagreement with. I go on to consider the implications of such an account for our understanding of moral disagreement and of those with whom we disagree.
- Philosophy