Daniel Hausman is the Herbert A. Simon and Hilldale Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
ABSTRACT: Health is in itself good for people, and it contributes to other good things. If one supposes, as economists do, that preference satisfaction is a guide to well-being, one can determine the contribution of health to well-being by eliciting preferences. Yet it is problematic to measure health by its contribution to well-being and well-being by the satisfaction of preferences. The contribution of health to well-being is not separable from the contributions of other goods, and individuals who have serious health deficits may restructure their lives so as to attain a level of well-being fully comparable to the well-being of those who have no health problems. Moreover, from a public perspective in a liberal state, the contribution that health makes to opportunity may be a better measure of the value of health than its contribution to well-being. Yet, measuring health by its contribution to well-being apparently makes the burdens of ill-health commensurable with other goods, and, moreover, it is questionable whether there is a feasible alternative to measuring health by well-being and well-being by preferences.
- Philosophy